市场评论

小曲

下面是九月八号Conference call 对市场评论的总结，贴出来，希望对大家有帮助。
% T( z4 M4 c9 y( h# L. d3 B
3 G9 @2 t/ l6 Y$ OMarket Commentary
Eric Bushell, Chief Investment Officer
James Dutkiewicz, Portfolio Manager
9 h5 F/ ~4 R: l' u. U) Q$ I" G6 P# ]Signature Global Advisors

8 ~" X/ Z- D1 y6 F6 Z+ ?! f, u
Background remarks
: ^, ^$ s& ?/ S1 Z6 Y" I0 N, H Governments’ costs associated with stabilizing the crisis, including recent government stimulus programs, are
. t+ Z) x+ s6 R# U2 W5 Kas much as 20% or even 60% of GDP.
/ @6 k. A% y2 I Some governments have reached limits of sustainable debt loads and markets are beginning to insist on fiscal
adjustments.
/ P' W( E( U. P: b4 ` This marks the beginning of what will be a turbulent social and political period, where elements of the social
/ f3 g/ W1 ?) Y+ Nsafety nets in Western economies are no longer affordable and must be defunded.
 Templates for fiscal adjustment are appearing in peripheral and core Europe, the U.S. and elsewhere. There are
lessons to be learned from the frontrunners.
5 A9 d7 {8 [# Z4 h4 V0 R We see policy interventions playing a bigger role in financial markets. Policymakers are trying to ease these
adjustments for governments and consumers as they deleverage.
3 ^$ ?. s( y/ Q9 f Policy interventions are shaping markets more than fundamentals. Examples include the U.S. Federal Reserve’s
quantitative easing (QE2) program and the ECB intervention in the European sovereign bond market.
0 @) g7 L: y) O  ]+ F" v2 ? Developed financial markets have now priced in lower levels of economic growth.
 Credit markets are now less resilient to shocks because of Basel III and the Dodd-Frank bill. Brokers have
reduced capacity to hold risk. Therefore, risk shedding by others is going to have a greater impact.

小曲

Current situation
8 v$ H+ m% c: k9 l; Z. X  e The lesson we learned from the 2008-2009 credit crunch is how credit markets affect stock valuations. As long
: K" F" |- n( N; J) qas funding markets stay open, equities are valued as going concerns. But if credit markets close, markets may
impose liquidation values.
 In the summer, the European credit crisis caused another round of market worries about a credit shutdown. In
August, we said a credit shutdown was unlikely – we continue to hold that view.
0 e- b4 q  u$ N; D# Z" n The collapse of interest rates on 10-year Treasuries to 2% leaves banks, insurance companies and pension
scrambling for higher yields to satisfy their obligations – this is supportive of corporate bond markets.
  H* Y0 i( s  T4 g  }, f, W  h
A look at credit markets
* v1 S% E) w! M  _$ B! I Investment grade – $17 billion in new issues were placed last Wednesday. We’re expecting $80-$100 billion in
3 C% Y* x4 S8 ?, @September. Non-financial investment grade is the new safe haven.
8 |3 ]$ M" L/ F" u- L5 \ High yield – In March, the spread above governments was 450 basis points, today it’s 740 bps. Yields were 7%
) l5 |& u5 b/ @' v1 D$ W( fthen, now they are 8.5%. New issuance has been about $30 billion a month, although August saw only $1
billion. That said, the market is still open. Risk has been repriced – but appropriately priced issues still have
access to the market. There are only two parts of the global bond market having difficulty – ultra-low-grade
- A8 f) D) K8 v- ]: f& z, m9 j- ^CCC issues and European high yield, which are both down about 2.5% year-to-date. All other bond markets are
positive for the year-do-date, including high yield.
# X: h- |+ U1 Q; x( R6 }0 ] Mortgages – There is no funding for new construction, but existing quality properties are having no trouble
finding financing.
 Commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) – In the summer, there were two failed transactions, but they
; {8 u; z, C2 A: twere subsequently repriced and placed. In the fall, there will be more deals.
+ c, G" `. x0 z$ O) d Leveraged floating rate collateralized loans – The index was trading at $90 last September, $96 in March and
is now back to $90. Changes were a result of interest rate expectations (people thought that interest rates were
going up) rather than liquidity. Chapter 11 companies have no problem getting secured and when they file for
  |; B+ _7 h5 C* Kbankruptcy, they already have debt financing in place.
 European banks – European bank lending conditions are tighter. This is the weakest link in the financial chain
today.
* e8 P! R7 o. b0 M2 Y* i: j' V Emerging markets – Sovereign rates have rallied along with U.S. Treasuries. High-grade corporates in
emerging markets have no problem with funding.

小曲

European Union agenda
6 R# y, Z, _) |' G% s Europe is frantic and will remain so for at least another four months – which is what we see as the timeline for
the Greek default.
) Z$ k+ r4 @6 X. S As we see it, the following firewalls need to be put in place:
1. Making sure that banks have enough capital and deposit insurance to survive a Greek default
3 ~* G( F+ j9 P6 i: b2. The European Financial Stability Facility, which is to be used for the bank capital injection and sovereign
& U, {; V' H# \4 c8 w# Ddebt stabilization, needs government approvals.
. e6 H% W8 P- L) t" ]3. Measures of assistance to help European banks to make $1.7 trillion in refinancing easier and allowing
5 U- h0 E8 t3 e0 Kbanks to shrink their balance sheets over three years
4. More fiscal reform for Spain, Italy and France is a precondition for stable sovereign debt markets.
* Q' N, I5 g; P, i: X& {
Beyond Greece
" l3 J* J. `4 M The EFSF #2 plan announced in July was a toolkit to deal with the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain),
but that was before Italy.
& W2 ^! H& E- j It provided a $500-billion loan program, but $250 billion was already spoken for by the PIGS.
 It’s an undersized framework and if negative growth/interest rate dynamics keep investors from sponsoring the
Italian bond market, the EU crisis will escalate further.

& D& l& r* V8 x% O8 B$ bConclusion
% i3 U# E+ G; r" x& g) v' O We want to have safeguards in place and continue to be liquid, so that we can capitalize on future turbulence.

yuz967

kasnkan